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1 Frank  Dikötter’s  work,  appearing  half  a
century  after  the  most  murderous  year
(1960),  will  henceforth  be  the  leading
account  on  the  “Great  Famine.”  Like
Jasper  Becker’s  book,1 Dikötter’s  focuses
on describing and conveying to the reader
the stark effects of the famine at the local
level,  whereas  a  series  of  other  good
accounts have concentrated on analysing
the decisions and political conflicts at the
top of the Communist hierarchy.2 Unlike
Becker,  Dikötter  is  careful  with  his
sources: it is the work of a researcher and
not  just  moving  and  well-meaning
journalistic reportage.
2 With non-experts  in  mind,  the  first  two
(of six) parts retrace major events of the
Great Leap Forward disaster and famine,
rightly  stressing  the  crucial  role  of  the  Lushan Conference:  “Had  the  leadership
reversed course in the summer of 1959 at Lushan [as they had intended to before the
Peng Dehuai affair], the number of victims claimed by famine would have been counted
in the millions. Instead, as the country plunged into catastrophe, tens of millions of
lives would be extinguished through exhaustion, illness, torture and hunger” (p. 103).
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Ironically entitled “Dizzy with Success” – in reference to a famous article of 2 March
1930 in which Stalin called for the inevitable halt to collectivisation and dekulakisation,
blaming it on local communist cadres’ excesses – Chapter 11 describes in detail the pre-
Lushan  period,  when  Mao  had  been  so  disturbed  as  to  declare,  “I  now  support
conservatism [and thus prudence]. I stand on the side of right deviation. I am against
egalitarianism and left adventurism…” However, he took the latter path six months
later.  Chapter  16,  which  concludes  the  chronological  section,  contains  the  newest
elements: it eloquently shows how then-president Liu Shaoqi finally took cognisance of
the extent of the disaster in the spring of 1961, thanks to an investigation he undertook
of his native village in Hunan and the surrounding area. Unlike Mao, Liu resolved not to
be misled by local authorities’ versions, and ended up learning from villagers that there
had,  in  fact,  been  no  drought  in the  region  the  previous  year:  the  disaster  was
manmade (renhuo), not a natural calamity. That was the position he took subsequently:
“The centre is the principal culprit, we leaders are all responsible” (p. 121). It was a
sacrilege for which Mao would not pardon him: this chapter anticipates the epilogue, in
which the author recalls the famous 7,000 Cadres Conference (January 1962) and the
stormy encounter six months later in which Liu told a furious Mao, “History will judge
you and me” (p. 337). Convinced that he had found China’s Khrushchev, and fearing
that Liu would denounce him later in a “secret speech,” Mao did all he could to prevent
such a terrible eventuality: the book ends on this sinister foreboding of the Cultural
Revolution.
3 Dikötter’s main contribution lies not so much in detailing the goings-on at the top, the
broad  outlines  of  which  are  known,  but  rather  in  describing  and  analysing  local
situations, enriched by raiding the contents of a dozen provincial archives that only
recently became accessible. A series of succinct but dense chapters (the book has 37)
vividly depict – dare one say – survival strategies, repressive violence, the fate of the
most vulnerable (children, women, the aged), the various ways in which people died,
and  the  places  where  most  deaths  occurred:  Xinyang  (Henan),3 Tongwei  (Gansu),
Guizhou, Anhui, Shandong, and Sichuan, not forgetting the laogai and laojiao victims. By
way  of  conclusion,  the  last  chapter  offers  a  new  tally  of  the  number  of  deaths.
Combining  local  data  from  various  provinces,  especially  Sichuan,  and  the  rigorous
argumentation of Cao Shuji, who concluded in 2005 that 32.5 million premature deaths
occurred,4 Dikötter  considers  it  necessary to  add a  dozen millions  to  that  figure:  a
minimum of 45 million deaths, by the author’s calculations (p. 333). Of these, at least 2.5
million were beaten, tortured to death, or summarily killed, he adds.
4 Be it local cadres’ powers over people’s life and death, dead rats being fished out of
cesspools to be eaten (p. 284),  cannibalism (p. 320-23), or hogs trampling on smaller
piglets and devouring them (p. 142), the horror that figures on almost every page is
presented  in  a  sober  and  factual  manner.  Sobriety  also  informs  the  description  of
victims’ comportment: the “masses” are not idealised. They try to survive by all means,
even at the cost of others (p. xv, 214 and Chapter 26). One should not be too hasty in
characterising as “resistance,” much less revolt, the slightest sign of these desperate
measures, even though some collective actions might well merit such a description.
5 Meanwhile, there is something lacking in this fine book: a demographic and economic
perspective of the catastrophe. The latter is too lightly attempted, the former not at all.
Instead,  the  perspective  offered  at  the  outset  deliberately  leans  towards
Tiananmenology, stressing with some smugness – for a change – the Mao-Stalin and
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then Mao-Khrushchev rivalry. To be clear: there’s no question of letting Mao off lightly
– he was the prime culprit behind the disaster – or of underplaying (how could one?)
his pride, arrogance, blunders, and criminal stubbornness. But instead of once again
narrating  well-known  episodes  such  as  Mao’s  humiliation  of  Khrushchev  by  the
Zhongnanhai swimming pool (p. 44) or the shelling of the offshore islands Quemoy and
Matsu without notifying Moscow (p. 45), would it not have been more useful to set out
briefly that demographic transition had hardly progressed on the eve of the Great Leap
Forward? Fertility remained high, and mortality was decreasing at a rate all the more
vigorous  as  generalised  prevention  (essentially  vaccination)  and  other  measures
adopted in the previous eight years had reversed, or in certain cases eradicated, most
infectious and parasitic diseases. In less than a decade (1949-57), infant mortality had
fallen  by  two-thirds  –  according  to  official  figures,  which  were  no  doubt  given  to
exaggerating achievements. At any rate, infants’ survival was better assured in China
on the eve of the famine than ever before. Many children who starved to death between
1958 and 1962 would not have been alive in 1958 had infant mortality stayed at the
pre-1949 level. (Those who survived would eventually add to worries over the problem
of retirees, which is not exclusively linked to the one-child policy). Staying with the
pre-Great Leap Forward situation, an extremely high natural growth rate characteristic
of the first phase of demographic transition (between 20 and 25 per thousand annually
from  1955  to  1957)  compounded  another  problem:  feeding  a  rapidly  growing
population. Agriculture was facing great difficulty in catering to clamouring mouths. It
had been on the verge of disaster many times in the 1950s, before the aberrations of the
Great Leap Forward.
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2. For instance, David Bachman, Bureaucracy,  Economy, and Leadership in China:  The Institutional
Origins of the Great Leap Forward, Cambridge University Press, 1991; Alfred L. Chan, Mao’s Crusade:
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chinoise (Origins  of  the  Great  Leap  Forward:  The  case  of  a  Chinese  province)  1956-1958  (Éditions  de
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